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Abstract 
 
We develop a model in which informed overconfident market participants and informed 
rational speculators trade against trend-chasers. In this model positive feedback traders 
act as Computer Based Trading (CBT) and lead to positive feedback loops. In line with 
empirical findings we find a positive relationship between the volatility of prices and the 
size of the price reversal. The presence of positive feedback traders leads to a higher 
degree of trading activity by both types of informed traders. Overconfidence can lead to 
less price volatility and more efficient prices. Moreover, overconfident traders may be 
better off than their rational counterparts. 
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1 Introduction
The analysis of feedback trading is fundamental nowadays. Indeed, the revival of its extensive
use has been blamed for the Flash Crash of the 6th of May 2010.1 As pointed out in the
Introduction of Foresight: The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets (2012) and
also more specifically in Zygrand et al. (2012) the use of Computer Based Trading (CBT) may
lead to positive feedback loops that can have profoundly damaging effects, leading to major share
sell-offs. It uses very mechanical rules without any human interventions and it is estimated that
CBT amounts for around 30% of the UK’s equity trading volume and more than 60% for the
USA. The very fact that CBT is thought to have caused major market disruptions as recently
as 2010 motivates further investigation of feedback trading in a more complex environment
where different types of traders interact. In particular, as overconfidence is a psychological bias
present in all markets, it is interesting to know how overconfident traders behave in the presence
of positive feedback traders or CBT.
In this paper we use a dynamic model where traders can be one of three types: overconfident,
feedback equivalent to CBT or rational. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the interactions
between the different types of traders. One question of interest, and still unanswered, is how
this interaction impacts the market. In the following paper, we concentrate our analysis on one
aspect of CBT namely the creation of feedback loops and we do not look at the High Frequency
Trading aspect of CBT.2
The existence of trend-chasing behavior is a well established fact. Andreassen and Kraus
(1990) and Mardyla and Wada (2009) use experiments to show its relevance. In addition, other
analyses have empirically found evidences of trend-chasing behavior in financial markets. Frankel
and Froot (1988) observe that in the mid-1980’s the forecasting services were issuing buy recom-
mendations while maintaining that the dollar was overpriced relative to its fundamental value.
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) find evidences that individual investors use positive feed-
back trading strategies and that this behavior can be attributed to an irrational extrapolation
of past growth rates. Several studies have focused on the behavior of institutional investors (Shu
(2009), Sias and Starks (1997), Sias, Starks and Titman (2001), Dennis and Strickland (2002)
to name but a few). According to most of these papers, institutional investors use positive
feedback strategies and therefore destabilize stock prices. Finally, Bohl and Siklos (2005) find
the existence of momentum strategies during episodes of stock market crashes. Evidences of
contrarian strategies are also present in financial markets. The short-term portfolio composition
strategies suggested by Conrad et al. (1994), Cooper (1999), and Gervais and Odean (2001) find
that US markets showed anomalous, “contrarian” behavior. Moreover, Evans and Lyons (2003)
1On that day, the US equity market dropped by 600 points in 5 minutes and regained almost all the losses in
30 minutes.
2The interested reader can look at Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) for instance.
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obtain evidence of negative feedback trading, at the daily frequency.
Our paper uses the dynamic setting of De Long et al. (1990). It is also close to the spirit
of Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman (2006). The former paper establishes that rational
speculation together with the presence of positive feedback traders can destabilize prices and
facilitate the creation of price bubbles. However, the consequences of the interaction between
feedback and overconfident traders is still unknown. We introduce the presence of informed over-
confident traders in order to look at how overconfident traders exploit the presence of feedback
traders.3
The overconfidence was first analyzed by psychologists. Kahneman and Tversky (1973),
and Grether (1980) stress that people overweight salient information. This behavior is well
documented in psychology for very diverse situations. Due to the essence of financial markets,
overconfidence occurs among market participants. Indeed, the competition between traders
implies that the most successful ones survive, leading them to overestimate their own ability. It
is well documented that the presence of overconfident traders increases the volatility of prices (see
Odean (1998) for instance). As a consequence, we could expect that when overconfident traders
interact with positive feedback traders prices would depart even more from their fundamental
values and that prices display more volatility. Indeed, positive feedback traders buy (sell)
securities when prices rise (fall). In doing so, they introduce noise in the market as they lead
prices to move away from fundamentals. As established by De Long et al. (1990), the presence of
positive feedback traders stimulates trading by informed traders’ leading to more price volatility.
However, one of the main results of the paper shows that the presence of overconfident traders can
diminish the volatility of prices when positive feedback traders are present in the market. Indeed,
the volatility of prices decreases with the number of overconfident traders and with their level of
overconfidence. This means that overconfident traders temper the destabilizing role of feedback
traders and lead to a more stable market. The presence of overconfident traders leads rational
traders to scale down their trading leading to a decrease of the volatility of prices caused by
positive feedback traders. One interpretation of this result is that overconfident traders commit
to react more to their private information. Introducing more information counterbalances the
effect of positive feedback.
Our analysis, enables us to answer the following important questions. What is the main
determinant of the excess price volatility? How does the link between psychological character-
istics of the participants and their trading profits evolve according to different proportions of
irrational traders? What is the effect of the traders’ risk aversion on price stabilization? Where
do the underreaction and/or overreaction to new information come from? This paper can also
be seen as an attempt to understand the relationship between feedback loops and crashes (for
3As in Germain et al. (2014), we consider that overconfident traders overestimate the mean of the liquidation
value of the risky asset (called mean bias) but also misperceives the variance of the liquidation value.
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instance Flash Crash) in a complex environment where several types of traders interact. This
analysis can ultimately give us some insights regarding the regulation of CBT.
We first give our results for the case where there is no feedback trading or CBT. In that case,
the trading of overconfident investors enhances the volatility of prices, and worsens the quality
of prices as well as their expected utility. We obtain that the presence of overconfident implies
a larger volume being traded. Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) use U.S. market level data
to test this link and argue that after high returns subsequent trading volume will be higher as
investment success increases the degree of overconfidence.
Our second set of results looks at the case where feedback traders are present. When there
is a sufficient large number of trend-chasing speculators, overconfident traders may have higher
expected utility than their rational opponents. Kyle and Wang (1997), Benos (1998) and Ger-
main et al. (2014) find a similar result. However some other studies predict the opposite i.e.
that overconfident agents trade to their disadvantage (Odean (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001),
Caballe´ and Sa´kovics (2003), Biais et al. (2004) among others). Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and
Titman (2006) show that irrational traders can earn positive expected profit in the presence of
positive feedback trading if they trade early. Indeed, higher stock prices may attract customers
and employees which may reduce the firm’s cost of capital and provide a cheap currency for
making acquisition. Also, stock prices increase may initially generate cash flow. This simple
mechanism does not require irrational traders to be sophisticated enough to think of the positive
feedback trading effect and to realize profits. We also find that positive feedback traders earn
negative expected profits.
We obtain that price changes can be negatively or positively serially correlated at long
horizons. The sign of this serial correlation depends on some of the parameters of the model.
The negativity of the serial correlation is a well documented property of prices and is also found
in De Long et al. (1990). We obtain that prices can be positively serially correlated when
overconfident traders are not too numerous and they believe that the information of the other
traders is more precise than it is. This result occurs in Odean (1998) when rational traders
trade with overconfident traders who undervalue the signals of other traders. We extend that
result to a situation where 3 different types of traders trade with each other. Daniel et al.
(1998) consider a situation where investors are overconfident about the precision of their private
signals. However, the noisy public information is correctly estimated by all market participants.
Price changes exhibit a positive short-lag autocorrelations (called “overreaction phase”) and a
negative correlation between future returns and long-term past stock market (long-run reversals
called “correction phase”). We assume that both rational and overconfident traders are risk
averse with the same level of risk aversion. We find that increasing the traders’ risk aversion
increases the negative serial correlation of prices. The literature on feedback trading concludes
that the presence of positive (negative) feedback traders leads to negative (positive) serially
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correlated returns together with an increase (decrease) in volatility (see Shu (2009), Sias and
Starks (1997), Sias, Starks and Titman (2001), Bohl and Siklos (2005), and Cooper (1999), for
instance).
Finally, we obtain that both rational and overconfident traders trade more when feedback traders
are present. This result is also present in De Long at al. (1990) for the impact of feedback trading.
In addition, it also found in the literature that the presence of overconfident traders leads to a
high degree of trading activity (Odean (1998), Barber and Odean (2001), Odean (1999), Glaser
and Weber (2007), Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) among others).
In line with empirical findings we find a positive relationship between the volatility of prices
and the size of the price reversal. However our model cannot establish any causality. Neverthe-
less, we obtain that this result depends on different parameters of the model such as the number
of positive feedback traders, how overconfident perceive the information of others, as well as the
number of informed traders present in the model. In addition we obtain that the presence of
positive feedback traders leads to a higher degree of trading activity by both types of informed
traders.
When we introduce negative feedback traders instead of positive feedback traders, we find
that most of the results obtained with the presence of positive feedback are reversed. Price
volatility is reduced whereas price efficiency is enhanced due to the presence of contrarian trading.
Price volatility and price efficiency increase with both the number of overconfident traders and
with their level of overconfidence. The overall volume traded by rational traders increase with
the number of negative feedback whereas the volume traded by overconfident is U -shaped with
respect to the number of negative feedback. We find the serial correlation of returns to be
negative and to decrease with the number of negative feedback traders. Finally the expected
profit of the negative feedback traders decrease with the number of negative feedback traders
present in the market and is positive for low enough number of negative feedback traders.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce the general model and
characterize the different types of traders. In section 3, we derive the trading equilibrium. In
section 4 we analyze the effects of the overconfidence and of the positive feedback trading on some
parameters of interest for financial markets. In section 5, we are interested in understanding
the social standpoint. In section 6, we look at how our results are changed when we replace
positive feedback traders by negative feedback traders. In section 7, we discuss our model and
draw some empirical implications. Finally, we conclude in section 8. All proofs are gathered in
the Appendix.
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2 The Model
We analyze a model with four periods, at each of the first three periods trade takes place whereas
consumption takes place at t = 4. Two assets, namely a riskless and a risky asset, are exchanged
during the three trading periods. The riskless interest rate is normalized to zero. The liquidation
value of the risky asset, v˜, is assumed to be normally distributed with v˜ ∼ N (v¯, h−1v ).
We consider a trading system where agents are price takers. At each auction t, the demands
for the risky asset and the riskless asset are xt and ft respectively. Three types of investors
trade the assets:
• N1 overconfident traders. They receive information about the liquidation value of the risky
asset. They believe that their private signals are more accurate than they actually are.
Furthermore, they overestimate the expected liquidation value of the risky asset.
• N2 rational traders. These traders receive private information but do not distort it.
• P feedback agents who can be either positive feedback or negative feedback traders.4 They
do not base their trading decisions on fundamental values, instead they react to stock price
change. Their order size is proportional to the change in price of the asset.
We denote by Pt the price of the risky asset at time t for t = 1, 2, 3. At time t = 4, the
value of the risky asset is publicly revealed, the price is then equal to the realization of v˜.
Trader i’s wealth is Wti = fti +Ptxti for trading rounds t = 1, 2, 3 and W4i = f3i + v˜x3i for the
last trading round. Let us denote x¯ as the per capita supply of the risky asset. It is assumed to
be known to all and constant over time.
No information is released before the first trading round. Before each subsequent trading
round t = 2 and t = 3, each rational and overconfident trader receives one ofM different signals
concerning the liquidation value of the asset. Each trader receives a private signal y˜ti = v˜+ ε˜tm,
with ε˜tm ∼ N (0, h
−1
ε ) and ε˜t1, . . . , ε˜tm for ∀ t = 2, 3 being mutually independent. As in Odean
(1998) we assume thatM < N1+N2, i.e. there are more traders than signals, and that both N1
and N2 are multiple of M , i.e. overconfident traders are, on average, equally informed as their
rational counterparts. Let Y¯t be the average private signal at time t, we have that:
Y¯t =
M∑
i=1
y˜ti
M
=
N1∑
i=1
y˜ti
N1
=
N2∑
i=1
y˜ti
N2
.
In other words, the informativeness of the private signals is the same for the two groups. This
setup allows us to exhibit the overconfidence effect without considering informational content
bias.
4We mainly analyze the first case in the paper.
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Overconfident market participants believe that the precision of their two signals, the one
received at t = 2 and the one received at t = 3, is equal to κhε with κ ≥ 1. They also believe
that the 2M − 2 other signals have a precision equal to γhε with γ ≤ 1. Overconfident traders
misperceive the distribution of the asset as well. Indeed, they believe that the average liquidation
value equals v¯+ b with b > 0 and that the precision of v˜ equals ηhv (η ≤ 1).
5 This framework is
consistent with theoretical and empirical findings.6 Indeed, traders tend to overestimate their
own signals and to correctly evaluate (or at worst to under-weight) public information.
A rational agent correctly estimates both the mean of the liquidation value of the risky asset
and her private signal. In other words, a rational investor acts as an overconfident trader with
η = κ = γ = 1 and b = 0.
All informed agents are assumed to be risk averse. Their preferences are described by a
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function of the following form
u(W ) = −e−aW ,
where a denotes the coefficient of risk-aversion and W the final wealth.
Each informed trader i chooses his order at time t, xti, so that
xti ∈ argmaxE[−e
−aWti |Φti],
where Φti denotes the available information to trader i at time t.
As in Odean (1998), De Long et al. (1990) and Brown and Jennings (1989), informed traders
look one period ahead when solving for their optimal strategy i.e. they are myopic.7
Finally, at time t = 2, 3, each feedback positive agent i submits an order xfti, with the
following form x
f
ti = β(Pt−1 − Pt−2). Feedback traders only participate to the last two rounds
of trading.
3 The equilibrium
To solve their maximization programs, informed traders whether rational or overconfident as-
sume that prices are linear functions of the average signal(s) such that:
P3 = α31 + α32Y¯2 + α33Y¯3, (3.1)
P2 = α21 + α22Y¯2. (3.2)
5However, in order to keep the model simple in all the simulations we are holding η = 1 and b = 0.
6See Fabre and Franc¸ois-Heude (2009), for instance.
7As mentioned by Odean (1998), assuming myopia when traders conjecture that they do not affect prices leads
to the fact the informed traders’ demand do not incorporate any hedging demand. This can be seen in Brown
and Jennings (1989).
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At each auction, an informed agent determines his demand by considering both his pri-
vate signal(s) and the price schedule(s). Each informed market participant i has access to the
following information Φ2i = [y2i, P2]
T and Φ3i = [y2i, y3i, P2, P3]
T for date t = 2 and t = 3,
respectively. Due to the presence of positive feedback trading and when deciding his demand,
an informed trader takes into account that his current trade may lead the future price away
from fundamentals.
Proposition 3.1 If aβP < g∗(N1, N2), in other words, when the number of feedback traders
(P ), the strength of feedback trading (β) or the informed traders’ risk aversion is not too
large8,there exists a unique linear equilibrium in the multi-auction market characterized by:
α31 =
(N1η+N2)hv v¯+N1ηhvb−a(N1+N2+P )x¯
(N1η+N2)hv+2(N1(κ+γM−γ)+N2M )hε
+
aPβ(α21−P1)
(N1η+N2)hv+2(N1(κ+γM−γ)+N2M )hε
,
α32 = α33 +
aβPα22
(N1η+N2)hv+2(N1(κ+γM−γ)+N2M )hε
,
α33 =
N1(κ+γM−γ)hε+N2Mhε
(N1η+N2)hv+2(N1(κ+γM−γ)+N2M )hε
,
where g∗(N1, N2), α21, α22 and the different agents’ demands over time are given in the Ap-
pendix.
Proof: See Appendix.
The number of positive feedback traders has an impact on the different parameters α except
on α33. Indeed, at the last auction, informed agents cannot trigger feedback trading on the basis
of their new information. Nevertheless, all prices are influenced and connected by the presence
of trend-chasing traders. More precisely, the link between P3 and Y¯2 (captured by α32) depends
on the link between P2 and Y¯2 (i.e. α22). The greater the intensity of feedback trading (β and
P ) the stronger this link is. Similarly, the informed traders’ risk aversion, a, strengthens this
link.
As both types of informed traders are aware of the presence of positive feedback traders, they
take that into account when trading. Indeed, upon, for instance, receiving good news before
both auctions, informed traders take larger position based on that information at t = 2 in order
to drive prices up. This triggers even more buying later on from feedback traders which enables
them to unload their position at an inflated price resulting in positive expected profit.
However, when the number of feedback traders is much larger than the number of informed
traders or when the informed traders have a high level of risk aversion (a), there is not equi-
librium. Indeed, the intensity of feedback trading is so strong that the prices move away too
much from the fundamental value of the risky asset. And the informed market participants are
reluctant to trade with such an intensity.
8This condition is showed in the Appendix.
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In de Long et al. (1990), they show that the condition for the existence of a stable solution
is close to ours (in their article the multiplication of the intensity of feedback trading by the
risk aversion coefficient is bounded and the number of feedback traders is equal to the number
of informed investors).
In Hirshleifer et al. (2006), irrational traders do not anticipate the feedback effect and the
rise in price causes stakeholders (for instance workers) to make greater firm-specific investments
when they anticipate the growth of the firm. This in turn increases the final payoff of the risky
asset. Nevertheless, risk averse traders trade less aggressively and dampen the feedback effect.
4 Volatility, Quality of Prices, Serial Correlation of prices and
Trading Volume
In this section, we focus on the influence of the irrational behavior on the volatility of prices,
measured as the variance of prices, on the quality of prices at t (the variance of the difference
between the price and the liquidation value, var(Pt− v˜)), the serial correlation of prices and on
the different market participants’ trading volume.
4.1 Volatility
Proposition 4.2 (Volatility) For trading rounds t = 2, 3, the volatility of stock prices in-
creases with the number of positive feedback traders.
Proof: See Appendix.
Trend chasing increases volatility in the market. This works through two channels. Increasing
P increases the “amount of feedback trading” which in turn also impacts how both types of
informed traders trade. We can see that the overall effect is to increase volatility. De Long
et al. (1990) shows that when only rational traders are present, they anticipate the presence
of feedback traders leading to more trading by rational informed traders. In different setups,
numerous previous studies have pointed out that the excess volatility of asset prices stems from
the trading behavior of overconfident traders (Odean (1998), Caballe´ and Sa´kovics (2000), among
others).
Our model predicts that the volatility is positively linked to the number of feedback traders.
This implies that more CBT as measured by the number of feedback traders leads to more
volatility in market.
The following result analyses, among other things, the effect of overconfident traders in our
setup. This result is obtained using numerical procedures.
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Result 4.1 (Volatility)
1. For trading rounds t = 2, 3, the volatility of stock prices increases with β, the feedback
trader’s trading intensity.
2. Overconfidence, measured by κ or the number of overconfident traders N1, can diminish
the volatility of prices. It crucially depends on the number of feedback traders. For a
large number of feedback traders, the price volatility decreases with overconfidence. When
P = 0, the volatility of prices increases with κ and N1.
3. The volatility of prices can increase with γ.
The first point of Result 4.1 is equivalent to the result of Proposition 4.1. The other two
points look at the effect of overconfidence in our setup. We find that the effect of overconfident
traders on the excess volatility depends critically on the number of feedback traders in the
market. When there are no positive feedback traders, we obtain the aforementioned result of
Odean (1998) and Caballe´ and Sa´kovics (2000). We obtain that same result as our model is
essentially the same as the two previous models. However, when positive feedback traders are
present this result can be reversed. This result also contradicts the finding of Benos (1998).
We find that the main source of excess volatility is due to feedback trading rather than the
trading from overconfident traders. Hence, overconfident traders can alleviate the effect of the
feedback traders and lead to a more stable market. This can be explained as follows, when
increasing the number of overconfident traders keeping constant the number of rational traders,
the following forces are at work. On the one hand increasing the number of overconfident
traders stabilizes prices as it increases the risk bearing capacity of the market. On the other
hand it destabilizes prices as more traders anticipate the trend-chasing behavior. However, the
reaction of both rational and overconfident traders is not identical. Indeed rational investors also
anticipate the impact of the presence of overconfident traders on the future price and scale down
their contemporary trading as they anticipate that overconfident traders trade “too much”.
The overall effect is such that that for small values of P , the volatility of prices is increased
by the presence of overconfident traders whereas for large values of P , the volatility of prices
decreases with overconfidence. The more positive feedback traders in the market, the larger the
latter effect. In other words, overconfident traders commit to trade more on their information
the greater P and introducing more information counterbalances the effect of positive feedback
trading or CBT.
The following two figures illustrate the effect of overconfidence on the volatility of prices as
described in the previous result.
We also obtain that, provided the number of feedback traders is large enough, a market
composed of overconfident traders only as opposed to a market with rational traders only can
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Figure 1: The variance of prices at time t = 3 as a function of the number of feedback traders and of
the number of overconfident traders.
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Figure 2: The variance of prices at time t = 3 as a function of the number of feedback traders and of
the number of overconfident traders.
have a lower volatility.
The effect of γ on the volatility of prices also depends on the number of feedback traders.
When P is small the volatility decreases with the underestimation of the precision of the other
signals. This result is not consistent with Odean (1998) as he obtains that the smaller the
parameter γ, the greater is the volatility of prices.
We now turn to the quality of prices.
4.2 Quality of Prices
We now examine the behavior of the quality of prices.
Proposition 4.3 (Quality of Prices) The quality of prices declines as the number of feedback
traders increases.
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Proof: See Appendix.
On the one hand, when the number of positive feedback traders increases, prices move away
from fundamentals and therefore become less informative. On the other hand, as informed
traders anticipate the trend-chasing strategies they trade more intensely on their private infor-
mation. However as said before, as a consequence rational traders scale down their trading. As
an overall, the price quality declines.
Result 4.2 (Quality of Prices)
1. The quality of prices declines as the feedback trading intensity increases (β increases).
2. Depending on the number of feedback traders, the quality of prices can either increase (for
large P ) or decrease (for small P or even P = 0) with N1. It increases with κ (for
large P ), decreases with it (for small P or even P = 0) or is non-monotonic with κ for
intermediate values of P .
In addition to responding to the trend-chasing strategies, overconfident traders alter the
quality of prices due to their irrationality.9 The impact of the overconfidence on the quality of
prices depends on whether or not there are feedback traders present and on their number. If
there is no trend-chasing behavior, the presence of overconfident traders moves prices away from
fundamentals and diminishes market efficiency. When the number of feedback traders is large,
the quality of prices improves with both the number of overconfident traders and the parameter
κ. This result is in contrast with the result obtained by Odean (1998) but is in accordance with
Benos (1998).
4.3 Serial Correlation of Prices
Proposition 4.4 (Serial Correlation of Prices) When there only rational traders and pos-
itive feedback traders, the price changes increase with the number of positive feedback traders.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result is in accordance with the intuition given previously.
Result 4.3 (Serial Correlation of Prices)
1. The serial correlation of prices in absolute value increases with the number of overconfident
9Ko and Huang (2007) show that arrogance can be a virtue. Indeed, overconfident investors believe that
they can earn extraordinary returns and will consequently invest resources in acquiring information pertaining
to financial assets. In our model there is no information-seeking activity which could permit to obtain such a
positive externality.
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traders (for low P or even P = 0) and is non-monotonic (initially increasing) with N1
for large P . It also increases with the level of overconfidence κ.
2. When only rational traders are present, the serial correlation of prices is negative and close
to zero.
3. The serial correlation of prices decreases with γ. In other words, the more precise the
other traders’ information is believed to be the smaller the price changes.
The serial correlation of prices depends critically on the overconfidence level and on the
number of positive feedback traders. In the presence of positive feedback trading, the serial
correlation is generally negative. It implies that positive feedback trading destabilizes the price
schedule. Informed traders cannot keep price at fundamentals or reduce the fluctuation of prices.
The term cov(P3 − P2, P2 − P1) describes the correction phase in Daniel et al. (1998).
They show that overconfident traders begin by overreacting to their private signals. In the
second phase, irrational market participants correct their beliefs and their order as new public
information arrives, this is defined as the “correction phase”. In our model, agents update
their beliefs concerning their private information. The informed market participants know that
their earlier trades move prices away from fundamentals as they try to exploit the presence
of feedback trading. The size of the departure of prices from fundamentals increases with
the number of feedback traders. At date 3, informed participants correct their demands after
observing their last signal which leads to price reversal. Odean (1998) finds such negative
correlation by considering overconfident agents only. When rational investors are introduced to
the model, he shows that the serial correlation of prices may be positive provided overconfident
agents sufficiently undervalue the signals of others. We extend his former result, as we show that
informed rational traders cannot prevent irrational traders (feedback agents as well overconfident
traders) to destabilize prices.
Figure 3 illustrates the last point of the proposition. It shows that the price change is more
important when each overconfident trader underestimates the precision of the other traders’
private information. However, there is a positive momentum when each overconfident trader
underestimates the other specific market participants’ signals.
The empirical literature on feedback trading concludes that the presence of positive (nega-
tive) feedback traders leads to negative (positive) serially correlated returns together with an
increase (decrease) in volatility (see Shu (2009), Sias and Starks (1997), Sias, Starks and Tit-
man (2001), Bohl and Siklos (2005), Conrad et al. (1994) and Cooper (1999) to name a few).
However, we find that when the market is composed with positive feedback traders and rational
traders the effect of the number of feedback traders is very small and the serial correlation of
prices is close to zero. The effect of P increases with the level of overconfidence. It can be seen
13
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Figure 3: The price changes as a function of the number of feedback traders for different values of γ.
that the combination of rational investors, positive feedback traders and overconfident traders
can lead to positive serial correlation of prices despite the presence of positive feedback traders.
This result is in sharp contrast with the literature such as Bohl and Reitz (2006) and Daniel et
al. (1998). Bohl and Reitz (2006) find a possible link between positive feedback trading and
negative return auto correlation during period of high volatility in the German Neuer Market.
Daniel et al. (1998) find that overconfidence and long-run reversals of returns may be linked.
They also find that the momentum effect is stronger for high volume stocks.
4.4 Trading Volume
Result 4.4 (Trading Volume)
1. The trading volume by both rational and overconfident traders increases with the number
of positive feedback traders.
2. The trading volume by overconfident traders can be a non-monotonic function of κ and this
comparative static depends on the number of feedback traders whereas the trading volume
by rational traders decreases with κ.
3. The trading volume originating from feedback traders increases with the traders’ overcon-
fidence, κ, and with the number of feedback traders.
When positive feedback traders are present, informed agents trade more aggressively. They
anticipate that the initial price increase will stimulate buying by feedback traders at the sub-
sequent auctions. In doing so, they drive prices up higher than fundamentals. Consequently,
positive feedback traders respond by trading even more. We find that the feedback trading as
well as the overconfidence enhances the trading volume. Several theoretical papers find this
result as well (See Delong et al. (1990) for the effect of feedback trading and Odean (1998) for
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the effect of overconfidence). Our result is consistent with empirical findings. Glaser and Weber
(2007) show that investors who think that they are above average in terms of investment skills
or past performance trade more. Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) use U.S. market level
data and argue that after high returns subsequent trading volume will be higher as investment
success increases the degree of overconfidence. This is also confirmed by Kim and Nofsinger
(2007) for Japanese traders on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Odean (1999) analyzes the trading
of 10,000 investors and find the aforementioned relationship between volume and overconfidence.
In figure 4, we compare the volume from overconfident traders and from rational traders with
no feedback traders. As expected, we see that overconfident traders trade more aggressively than
their rational counterparts. The volume from overconfident investors increases with κ, whereas,
as explained before, the volume from rational investor’s order decreases with κ. However, both
expected volumes decrease with the number of overconfident traders.
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Figure 4: The total individual overconfident trading volume as a function of the number of overconfident
agents, for different values of the parameter κ.
5 Trading Performance
We now look at expected expected utility of profits.
Result 5.5 (Expected Utility of Profits)
• Positive feedback traders always earn negative profits. The feedback traders’ losses increase
with their number and the intensity of their trading. Those losses increase with γ whereas
they decrease with both N1 and κ.
• If both κ and the number of feedback traders are large overconfident traders may earn
positive expected utility of profits. In that case overconfident traders are better off than
their rational counterparts. For a moderate level of overconfidence (for instance κ = 2)
and for a relatively large number of feedback traders, we also find the latter result.
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• The expected utility of overconfident traders can be increasing, decreasing or non-monotonic
with the number of positive feedback traders and with β. The effect of N1 and κ on the
profit of the overconfident traders is ambiguous: For large P , it is increasing with κ whereas
decreasing with κ for small P , it decreases with N1 for low β whereas it increases with
N1 for large β.
• The expected utility of profits earned by rational traders decrease with the feedback trading
(P and β). They increase with the number of overconfident traders and can increase with
κ for large P and low N1 and decrease with κ for low P and large N1.
Proof: See Appendix for the derivation of the expressions of the expected utility of profits
for the different traders.
Due to the fact that informed investors anticipate the presence of feedback trading, feedback
traders either buy shares at an inflated price or sell shares at a too low a price. Such trading
behavior leads these agents to lose money.
When there are only rational and overconfident traders in the market, we find that overcon-
fident traders earn less capital gains than their rational counterparts. This result is consistent,
among others, with Odean (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001). When the 3 types of traders are
present (overconfident, rational and positive feedback agents) overconfident agents may outper-
form rational traders. This result confirms Benos (1998), Kyle and Wang (1997) and Germain
et al. (2014). In these papers pure liquidity traders are present. Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam
and Titman (2006) show that irrational traders can earn positive expected profit in the presence
of positive feedback trading if they trade early.
The last part of the first point in the above proposition stems from the fact that the trend-
chasers’ trading volume decreases with κ and increases with γ.
We dedicate the next section to contrarian trading, i.e. feedback traders selling (buying)
when prices increase (decrease).
6 On Contrarian Trading
In this section we look at the case of contrarian trading. Given the setup of the model, we can
investigate the effect of negative feedback trading by considering a negative β (negative feedback
trading intensity). Negative feedback traders or contrarian traders sell (buy) securities when
prices rise (fall).
First of all, it should be noticed that due to their trading behavior, negative feedback traders
limit the movement of prices. Informed traders upon receiving some information will always fol-
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low their information and trade larger quantities as they know that due to negative feedback
trading subsequent prices will not fully reflect their information. This alters some of the com-
parative statics we found earlier for the case of positive feedback trading.
We find the obvious result that the volatility of prices decreases with the number of negative
feedback and increases with the number of overconfident.
The quality of prices in both periods decreases with the number of negative feedback whereas
the quality of prices in the third period increases with the number of overconfident and with κ.
The serial correlation of prices is negative and decreases with the number of negative feedback
traders.
The overall volume traded by rational investors increases with the number of negative feed-
back and decreases with the level of overconfidence in the market, κ. As for the case of positive
feedback traders, the overall volume traded by overconfident traders is non-monotonic in the
number of negative feedback traders. For a low number of feedback traders, the volume traded
by overconfident decreases with P whereas for a large number of feedback traders it increases
with P . The range for which it decreases with P increases as the level of overconfidence, κ,
increases.
Finally, we find that the expected profit of the negative feedback traders decreases with the
number of negative feedback present in the market and that they can derive positive expected
profits for a low number of negative feedback traders. In that case the second round gains
compensate the third round losses. However, as overconfident traders become more overconfi-
dent, measured by an increase of κ, the expected profit decreases. When feedback traders are
negative, they can earn positive expected profits as they sell (buy) at high (low) price due to
the informed traders behavior.
7 Discussion and Empirical Implications
In this section, we are interested in understanding how prices change in a financial market. We
have shown that positive feedback trading induces an increase in price volatility and worsens
market efficiency more than overconfident trading. When positive feedback agents are intro-
duced to the market, overconfident investors may obtain greater expected utility than rational
speculators. Positive feedback traders can suffer important losses if there are too numerous.
In order to investigate the level of prices, we have numerically simulated the price pattern
over time as a function of the number of positive feedback traders, the number of overconfident
traders and the risk aversion coefficient a.
Figure 5 shows the price pattern over time as a function of the number of feedback traders
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and the number of overconfident traders. Feedback trading is based on the previous prices
movement and appears as lagged trading. It can be seen that the number of both overconfident
traders and feedback traders impact prices. The more feedback traders, the more the price
initially increases and the more the decrease of prices between period 2 and 3. In the second
graph we can see that increasing the number of overconfident do not increase the variation of
prices for a relatively large number of feedback traders (here equal to 10).
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Figure 5: Prices over time for different values of P (the number of positive feedback traders)and for
different values of N1 (the number of overconfident agents).
We observe, in figure 6, that both the volatility of price and the price change increase with the
risk aversion coefficient. Informed investors react abruptly to new information and lead prices
to be more volatile. This result emphasizes that the risk aversion of the market participants can
explain part of the excess volatility observed in the market.
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Figure 6: The volatility of prices at date t = 3 and the cov(P3 − P2, P2− P1), for different values of the
parameter a.
Figure 7 shows that the price changes is less extreme when the market participants are
less risk averse. We also show how the difference between the overconfident investors ’demand
and the rational one depends on P and on the speculators’ risk aversion. As the risk aversion
increases and the number of feedback traders increases, rational and overconfident traders tend
to trade in the same manner. The difference is extreme when there are a large number of
feedback traders with a low level of risk aversion.
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Figure 7: Price over time for different values of a and difference demands between overconfident and
rational investors.
Empirically we find some testable implications.
Our model finds a positive relationship between the volatility of prices and the size of the
price reversal. Indeed, when the price volatility is low (high), the serial correlation of prices is
low (high). The causality is unclear in our model. This would have to be tested. The literature
on feedback trading concludes that the presence of positive (negative) feedback traders leads to
negative (positive) serially correlated returns together with an increase (decrease) in volatility.
For instance Siklos and Reitz (2006) puts forward that relationship between negative serially
correlated returns and high volatility when positive feedback traders are present. For further
evidences, see Shu (2009), Sias and Starks (1997), Sias, Starks and Titman (2001) and Bohl and
Siklos (2005), for instance.
Our model predicts that the size of the serial correlation and the volatility is linked to the
number of positive feedback traders. More positive feedback traders implies more volatility and
more negative serial correlation. If the two phenomena are observed in unison this could give
an indication of the presence of feedback traders.
De Long et al. (1990) find that prices exhibit a positive correlation at short horizons whereas
at long horizons price changes are negatively serially correlated. We show that this property
depends on different parameters of the model such as the number of positive feedback traders,
how overconfident perceive the information of others, as well as the number of informed traders
present in the model.
However, this property can be reversed when there are no rational traders and overconfident
traders are not too numerous and undervalue the information of others. In that case we find that
prices exhibit a negative correlation at short horizons whereas at long horizons price changes
are negatively serially correlated.
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From a policy point of view our paper, as others, would recommend the limitation of Com-
puter Based Trading (CBT) or algorithmic trading (AH) which would lead to feedback loop
destabilizing markets. Our specification of feedback traders is very close to the actual behavior
of computer based trading or algorithmic trading in the sense that both CBT and AH are very
mechanical. Our feedback traders chase the trend in this mechanical aspect and this aspect is
one major factor in the creation of asset of asset price bubbles.10 In our model, increasing CBT,
as measured by an increase of P and β, implies more volatility, greater price changes that both
can possibly lead to bubbles and then crashes.
8 Conclusion
Our paper analyzes the interaction between different type of traders in a financial market. We
shed some light on the result of the competition between feedback traders and two types of
informed traders some being rational and others being overconfident. This enables us to revisit
the well known result found by De Long et al. (1990) whereby rational speculation together
with the presence of positive feedback traders can destabilize prices and facilitate the creation
of price bubbles. We want to investigate the impact of introducing overconfident traders.
Positive feedback trading is one of the common mechanical strategy used by Computer Based
Trading (CBT). It is estimated that CBT ranks from 30% in the UK to 60% in the USA. Our
paper can be viewed as an analysis of the interaction between this type of trading and both
rational and overconfident informed traders.
Positive feedback traders or CBT increase price volatility. Their trade is based on past
prices which are determined by the informed trading in earlier stages. This causes a temporary
miscoordination between traders. This phenomenon is amplified by the fact that both over-
confident and rational traders anticipate the behavior of feedback-positive agents. The model
finds some striking results. Due to the competition between overconfident traders and rational
traders, we find that the presence of overconfident traders can decrease the volatility of prices
and improve price quality. The presence of overconfident traders leads rational traders to scale
down their trading implying a decrease of the volatility of prices caused by positive feedback
traders. Overconfident traders commit to react more to their private information. Introducing
more information counterbalances the effect of positive feedback.
We also find that the presence of feedback traders leads to an increase in the volume of both
rational and overconfident traders. It can also be the case that the expected utility of profits
from trading for overconfident traders are superior to the ones obtained by rational traders.
10Feedback trading is often cited as the reason of the bubble (see Zhou and Sornette (2006, 2009), Cajueiro,
Tabak and Werneck (2009), and Johansen, Ledoit, and Sornette (2003)). See also Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).
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In line with empirical findings we find a positive relationship between the volatility of prices
and the size of the price reversal. However our model cannot establish any causality. Neverthe-
less, we show that this result depends on different parameters of the model such as the number
of positive feedback traders, how overconfident perceive the information of others, as well as the
number of informed traders present in the model. In addition we obtain that the presence of
positive feedback traders leads to more volume being traded by both types of informed traders.
Finally, from a policy point of view our paper would recommend the limitation of Computer
Based Trading (CBT) or algorithmic trading (AH) as this type of trading destabilizes markets
by introducing volatility and leading prices to be less informative.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Equilibrium
This proposition is proved by backward induction, we then start with the last period, i.e. t = 3.
Third round t = 3
At time t = 3, each trader, noted i, has private information Φ3i which has a multivariate
distribution. The information available for trader i is : Φ3i = [y2i, y3i, P2, P3]
T .
An overconfident trader infers the mean of this distribution, Eb(Φ3i), and the variance-covariance
matrix, Ψb, as follows:
Eb(Φ3i) = [v¯ + b, v¯+ b, α21+ α22(v¯ + b), α31+ (α32 + α33)(v¯ + b)]
T ,
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Ψb =


1
ηhv
+ 1κhε
1
ηhv
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ηhv
+ α22Mκhε
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+
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ηhv
+ α33Mκhε C1 C2

 ,
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α22α33
ηhv
+ α22α32
(
1
ηhv
+ γ+Mκ−κ
M2κκγhε
)
, and C2 =
(α32+α33)
2
ηhv
+ (α32 + α33)
2
(
γ+Mκ−κ
M2κγhε
)
.
The mean, Er(Φ3i), and the variance-covariance matrix Ψr for the rational agent are obtained
by setting b = 0, η = κ = γ = 1 in Eb(Φ3i) and Ψb.
By solving the mean-variance problem, we obtain the ith insider’s orders:
xb3i =
Eb(v˜|Φ3i)− P3
avarb(v˜|Φ3i)
,
xr3i =
Er(v˜|Φ3i)− P3
avarr(v˜|Φ3i)
.
On the other hand, we know that each feedback trader i determines her order by considering
the trend of prices as follows :
xf3i = β(P2 − P1).
Using the projection theorem, we obtain the following
Eb(v˜|Φ˜3i) =
(y2i + y3i)(κ− γ)hε + (Y¯2 + Y¯3)γhεM + ηhv(v¯ + b)
ηhv + 2(κ+ γM − γ)hε
,
varb(v˜|Φ3i) =
1
ηhv + 2(κ+ γM − γ)hε
,
Er(v˜|Φ3i) =
(Y¯2 + Y¯3)hεM + hvv¯
hv + 2Mhε
,
varr(v˜|Φ3i) =
1
hv + 2Mhε
.
Replacing the above into the expressions of the different orders for the different types of traders
we obtain
xb3i =
1
a [(y2i + y3i)(κ− γ)hε + (Y¯2 + Y¯3)γhεM + ηhv(v¯ + b)− P3(ηhv + 2(κ+ γM − γ)hε)],
xr3i =
1
a [(Y¯2 + Y¯3)hεM + hvv¯ − P3(hv + 2Mhε)],
xf3i = β(P2 − P1).
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In equilibrium the total demand must be equal to the exogenous total supply, this is given by
N1∑
i=1
xb3i +
N2∑
i=1
xr3i +
P∑
i=1
xf3i = (N1 +N2 + P )x¯. (10.3)
From (10.3), the price P3 can be obtained as a function of Y¯2, Y¯3, P2 and P1
P3 =
1
Λ
[((N1γ +N2)Mhε + (κ− γ)N1hε) (Y¯2 + Y¯3) + (N1η +N2)hvv¯ +N1ηhvb
− a(N1 +N2 + P )x¯+ aPβ(P2 − P1)],
with Λ = (N1η + N2)hv + 2(N1(κ + γM − γ) +N2M)hε, Y¯2 = v˜ +
ε2i
M +
1
M
∑
j 6=iε2j and Y¯3 =
v˜ + ε3iM +
1
M
∑
j 6=iε3j.
Using equation (3.1) and identifying the parameters αi,j we obtain:
α31 =
(N1η+N2)hvv¯+N1ηhvb−a(N1+N2+P )x¯
Λ +
aPβ
Λ (α21 − P1),
α32 =
N1(κ+γM−γ)hε+N2Mhε
Λ +
aβP
Λ α22,
α33 =
N1(κ+γM−γ)hε+N2Mhε
Λ .
Second round t = 2
Using the third round’s results, we can obtain the second round’s parameters.
Let us introduce the following notations where b stands for the overconfident trader whereas
r stands for the rational one:
BTb = covb(P3,Φ2i) = [covb(y2i, P3), covb(P2, P3)],
BTr = covr(P3,Φ2i) = [covr(y2i, P3), covr(P2, P3)].
Using the projection theorem, we get
Ej(P3|Φ2i) = Ej(P3) +B
T
j varj(Φ2i)
−1(Φ2i − Ej(Φ2i)),
varj(Φ2i) =
(
varj(y2i) α22covj(y2i, Y¯2)
α22covj(y2i, Y¯2) α
2
22varj(Y¯2)
)
,
25
where j = b, r and Ej and varj denote the fact that they are computed following trader j’s
beliefs.
We obtain
Ej(P3|Φ2i) = (α32 + α33)v¯j + α31 +
1
Lj
((covj(y2i, P3)D
j
1 + covj(P2, P3)
Dj
3
α22
)(y2i − v¯)
+covj(y2i, P3)D
j
3 + covj(P2, P3)
Dj
2
α22
(Y¯2 − v¯)),
with
v¯j =
{
v¯ if j = r
v¯ + b if j = b
,
Db1 = varb(Y¯2) =
1
ηhv
+
(γ+Mκ−κ)
M2γκhε
,
Db2 = varb(y2i) =
1
ηhv
+ 1κhε ,
Db3 = −covb(y2i, Y¯2) = −
(
1
ηhv
+ 1Mκhε
)
,
Lb = varb(y2i)varb(Y¯2)− covb(y2i, Y¯2)
2 = (M−1)[((M−1)γ+κ)hε+ηhv ]
M2ηκγhvh2ε
.
Dr1, D
r
1, D
r
3, and Lr can be obtained by setting κ = γ = η = 1 in D
b
1, D
b
1, D
b
3, and Lb.
At the second round, informed trader i’s order is:
xb2i =
Eb(P3|Φ2i)− P2
avarb(P3|Φ2i)
,
xr2i =
Er(P3|Φ2i)− P2
avarr(P3|Φ2i)
.
The ith feedback agent’s order is:
xf2i = β(P1 − P0).
By equalizing exogenous supply and demand, we have:
(N1 +N2 + P )x¯ =
N1∑
i=1
Eb(P3|Φ2i)− P2
avarb(P3|Φ2i)
+
N2∑
i=1
Er(P3|Φ2i)− P2
avarr(P3|Φ2i)
+ Pβ(P1 − P0).
First round t = 1
At the first round, none of the traders participating to the market are informed. The different
agents’ orders are:
xr1i =
Er(P2)− P1
avarr(P2)
=
α21 + α22v¯ − P1
aα222varr(Y¯2)
,
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xb1i =
Eb(P2)− P1
avarb(P2)
=
α21 + α22(v¯ + b)− P1
aα222varb(Y¯2)
.
There are no feedback traders in the first round. However, the agents who will become informed
subsequently anticipate the presence of such behavior for the next two rounds.
Again, the no-excess supply equation leads to
(N1 +N2)x¯ =
N1∑
i=1
xb1i +
N2∑
i=1
xr1i.
The price P1 can then be derived:
P1 = α21 + α22v¯ +
−aα222x¯(N1 +N2)varr(Y¯2)varb(Y¯2) +N1α22bvarr(Y¯2)
N1varr(Y¯2) +N2varb(Y¯2)
.
From the above expression the parameters α21 and α22 can be identified.
After some computations, one can show that α22 =
N
caβP+d where N is independent of P , with
c = −(M − 1)[N1varr(P3|Φ2i)Lrt1 +N2varb(P3|Φ2i)Lbt2],
d = ΛηhvM
2κγhε
2LbLr(N1varr(P3|Φ2i) +N2varb(P3|Φ2i)),
N = (M − 1)[N1(κ+ γ(M − 1)) +MN2](N1varr(P3|Φ2i)Lrz1 +N2varb(P3|Φ2i)Lbz2),
with
t1 = [κ+ γ(M − 1)]hε + ηhv,
t2 = ηκγ(Mhε + hv),
z1 = 2(κ+ γ(M − 1))hε + ηhv,
z2 = 2ηκγMhε + ηκγhv,
Thus, we note that c < 0, d > 0 and N > 0.
We obtain the condition of equilibrium by considering that the parameter before the mean of
the signals α22
On the other hand, after some computations we have obtained the expression of α21 :
α21 =
A1/B1 + B2
D
with
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D = 1−
avarb(P3|Φ2i)(2Mhε + hv)α
2
33βP
N1(2Mhε + hv)α233 +N2Mhε(Mhε + hv)varb(P3|Φ2i)
B1 =
N1(2Mhε + hv)α
2
33
Mhε(Mhε + hv)
+N2varb(P3|Φ2i)
B2 =
avarb(P3|Φ2i)(2Mhε + hv)α
2
33βPα22
N1(2Mhε + hv)α
2
33 +N2varb(P3|Φ2i)Mhε(Mhvarepsilon + hv)
(v+E)
with
E =
−axα22(N1 +N2)
(
1
hv
+ 1Mhε
)(
1
ηhv
+ γ+Mκ−κ
M2κγhε
)
+N1b
(
1
hv
+ 1Mhε
)
N1
(
1
hv
+ 1Mhε
)
+N2
(
1
ηhv
+ 1
M2κγhε
)
A1 = N1
(2Mhε + hv)
Mhε(Mhε + hv)
α233(α31+F (v+b))+N2varb(P3|Φ2i)G+H
F =

(α32 + α33)−
(
α32+α33
ηhv
+ α32Mκhε
)(
γ+Mκ−κ
M2κγhε
− 1Mκhε
)(
α33
ηhv
+ α33
(
1
ηhv
+ γ+Mκ−κ
M2κγhε
))(
1
κhε
− 1Mκhε
)
(
1
ηhv
+ 1κhε
)(
1
ηhv
+ γ+Mκ−κ
M2κγhε
)
−
(
1
ηhv
+ 1Mκhε
)2


G = α31+(α32+α31)v−
(
α33
hv
+ α32
(
1
hv
+ 1Mhε
))(
1
hε
− 1Mhε
)
v(
1
hv
+ 1hε
)(
1
hv
+ 1Mhε
)
−
(
1
hv
+ 1Mhε
)2
H =
−a(2Mhε + hv)α
2
33varb(P3|Φ2i)((N1+N2 + P )x+ βPP0)
Mhε(Mhε + hv)
Therefore there exists an equilibrium when
{
α22 > 0
D > 0
In other words when,{
aβP < −dc
aβP < N1varb(P3|Φ2i) +
N2Mhε(Mhε+hv )
α2
33
(2Mhε+hv)
We have pointed out the condition of the equilibrium that maintains prices positive (and the
coefficient α22 > 0). Thus we exhibit a linear equilibrium when aβP < g
∗(N1, N2); with
g∗(N1, N2) = min
(
−d
c ,
N1
varb(P3|Φ2i)
+
N2Mhε(Mhε+hv )
α2
33
(2Mhε+hv)
)
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Proof of Proposition 4.2: Volatility
We now derive the variance of prices with respect to P .
• t = 2
The variance is given by var(P2) = α
2
22var(Y¯2) with α22 =
N
caβP+d .
The derivative of var(P2) with respect to P is then equal to
∂var(P2)
∂P
=
∂α222
∂P
var(Y¯2) = 2α22
∂α22
∂P
var(Y¯2) = 2α22
(
−caβ
N
(caβP + d)2
)
var(Y¯2) .
Given that var(Y¯2) > 0, α22 > 0 and −caβ
N
(caβP+d)2
> 0 it can be established that
∂var(P2)
∂P
> 0
.
• t = 3
The variance for t = 3 prices is given by
var(P3) = α
2
32var(Y¯2) + α
2
33var(Y¯3) + 2α32α33cov
(
Y¯2, Y¯3
)
= (α232 + α
2
33)(
1
hv
+
1
Mhε
) +
2α32α33
hv
.
Using the fact that α32 = α33 +
aβP
Λ α22, we can rewrite the variance of prices as follows
var(P3) =
(
α33 +
aPβ
Λ
α22
)[(
α33 +
aPβ
Λ
α22
)(
1
hv
+
1
Mhε
)
+
2α33
hv
]
+α233
(
1
hv
+
1
Mhε
)
.
The derivative is then given by the following expression
∂var(P3)
∂P
= 2
(
aβP
Λ
∂α22
∂P
+
aβPα22
Λ
)[(
α33 +
aβPα22
Λ
)(
1
hv
+
1
Mhε
)
+
α33
hv
]
.
Knowing that the condition of the equilibrium gives that α22 > 0 and
∂α22
∂P > 0 we directly
deduce that ∂var(P3)∂P > 0
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Proof of Proposition 4.3: Quality of Prices
We now look at the quality of prices. We first start with t = 2 and then turn to t = 3.
The quality of prices for t = 2 is given by var(P2− v˜) which is given by the following expression
var(P2−v˜) =
α222
hv
+
α222
Mhε
+
1
hv
−2
α22
hv
=
(α22 − 1)
2
hv
+
α222.
Mhε
The derivative with respect to P is positive and given by
∂var(P2 − v˜)
∂P
=
2(α22 − 1)
hv
∂α22
∂P
+
2α22
Mhε
∂α22
∂P
= 2
∂α22
∂P
[
α22 − 1
hv
+
α22
Mhε
].
For the quality of prices for t = 3, we proceed as for t = 2. The quality of prices is equal to
var(P3− v˜) =
(α32 + α33 − 1)
2
hv
+
α232 + α
2
33
Mhε
.
The derivative is then
∂var(P3 − v˜)
∂P
=
∂α32
∂P
(
2(α32+ α33 − 1)
hv
+
2α32
Mhε
)
.
Since α22 >
N
d > 1, we conclude that
∂var(P2−v˜)
∂P > 0 and
∂var(P3−v˜)
∂P > 0
Proof of Proposition 4.4: Serial Correlation of Prices
We now look at the serial correlation of prices. It is given by cov(P3 − P2, P2 − P1).
We have
cov(P3 − P2, P2 − P1) = cov(P3 − P2, P2) = cov(P3, P2)− cov(P2, P2) .
After some manipulations, it can be rewritten as
cov(P3 − P2, P2 − P1) = α22
(
var(Y¯2) (α32 − α22) + α32cov
(
Y¯2, Y¯3
))
.
Using the fact that α32 = α33 +
aβP
Λ α22, cov
(
Y¯2, Y¯3
)
= 1hv and that var(Y¯2) =
1
hv+Mhε
, we
obtain
cov(P3 − P2, P2 − P1) = α22
[(
α33 + α22
(
aβP
Λ
− 1
))
1
hv +Mhε
+
α33
hv
]
.
The derivative with respect to P is then given by
∂cov(P3 − P2, P2 − P1)
∂P
=
[
aβ
Λ
α222 +
∂α22
∂P
(
α33 + 2α22
(
aβP
Λ
− 1
))](
1
hv
+
1
Mhε
)
+α33
∂α22
∂P
1
hv
.
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We now consider the case where N1 = 0, after developing the different coefficients, we find:
∂cov(P3 − P2, P2 − P1)
∂P
(caβP + d)3
−caβNN2(M − 1)varb(P3|Φ2i)
= (−aβP +N2(2Mhε + hv))Z
with
Z =
[
1 +
(
Mhε + hv
2Mhε + hv
hε
)(
2
hv
+
1
Mhε
)
−
(
1
hv
+
1
Mhε
)]
This ends the proof. When N1 6= 0, we have obtained the results by simulations.
Proof of Proposition 5.6: The expected utility of profits
We now compute the expected utility profits for all type of traders for each trading round.
Third round for the different expected utility of profits
The overconfident traders’ expected utility of profits, Πb3i, is given by
Πb3i = E(x
b
3i(v˜−P3)) = E(x
b
3iv˜)−E(x
b
3iP3),
where the demand, xb3i, is
xb3i = α
∗(y2i+y3i)+β
∗(Y2+Y3)−γ
∗P3+δ
∗,
with α∗ = (κ−γ)hεa , β
∗ = γMhεa , γ
∗ = ηhv+2(κ+γ(M−1))hεa and δ
∗ = ηhv(v+b)a .
After having computed the two elements of the expected profit and after some simplifications
we obtain
Πb3i = (α
∗ + β∗)[ 2hv + 2v¯
2 − 2α31v¯ − (α32 + α33)(
2
hv
+ 2v¯2 + 1Mhε )]
− γ∗[α31(1− 2(α32 + α33))v¯ − α
2
31 + (α32 + α33)(1− (α32 + α33))(
1
hv
+ v¯2)−
(α2
32
+α2
33
)
Mhε
− α231]
+ δ∗[v¯(1− (α32 + α33))− α31].
We now focus on the rational traders’ expected profit, Πr3i. In order to compute Π
r
3i the same
steps as for calculating the expected profit of the overconfident traders can be followed. The
31
demand for the rational trader, xr3i, has the same linear form as the demand for the overconfident
trader. The coefficients are given by α∗ = 0, β∗ = Mhεa , γ
∗ = hv+2Mhεa and δ
∗ = hv v¯a .
The rational traders’ expected profit, Πr3i, can be obtained from (??) by replacing κ = γ = η = 1
and b = 0.
The feedback traders’ expected profit Πf3i depends on the first and second round prices P1 and
P2 through their demand x
f
3i = β(P2 − P1). It can be calculated by computing the following
expression
Πf3i = E(x
f
3i(v˜ − P3)) = E(x
f
3iv˜)−E(x
f
3iP3).
After some computations and simplifications, it is given
Πf3i = β [(α21 − P1) (α31 + (1− (α32 + α33)) v¯)− α22α31v¯]
+ β
[
( 1hv + v¯
2)[α22(1− α32 − α33)]− α22α32
1
Mhε
]
.
Second round profit
We now determine the overconfident traders’ expected profit Πb2i. As before the expected profit
is given by
Πb2i = E(x
b
2i(v˜−P2)) = E(x
b
2iv˜)−E(x
b
2iP2),
where xb2i =
Eb[P3/Φ2i]−P2
avarb[P3/Φ2i]
.
After some computations, we obtain
Πb2i =
1
avarb[P3/Φ2i]
[(Ab − α21) (−α21 + (1− α22)v¯)(Sb + Tb − α22)(
1
hv
+ v¯2 − α21v¯ − α22(
1
hv
+ v¯2 +
1
Mhε
))],
with
Ab = α31 + (α33 + α22)(v¯ + b)− (covb(y˜2i, P3))(D
b
1+D
b
3) + (
covb(P2,P3)(D
b
2
+Db
3
)
α22
)
v¯ + b
Lb
,
Sb =
covb(y˜2i,P3)
Lb
Db1 +
covb(P2,P3)
α22Lb
Db3,
Tb =
covb(y˜2i,P3)
Lb
Db3 +
covb(P2,P3)
α22Lb
Db2.
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The expected profit of the rational traders can be computed following the same steps, we then
obtain that
Πr2i =
1
avarr[P3/Φ2i]
[(Ar − α21) (−α21 + (1− α22)v¯)(Sr + Tr − α22)(
1
hv
+ v¯2 − α21v¯ − α22(
1
hv
+ v¯2 +
1
Mhε
))],
with
Ar = α31 + (α33 + α22)(v¯)− (covr(y˜2i, P3))(D
r
1 +D
r
3) + (
covr(P2,P3)(Dr2+D
r
3
)
α22
)
v¯
Lr
,
Sr =
covr(y˜2i,P3)
Lr
Dr1 +
covr(P2,P3)
α22Lr
Dr3,
Tr =
covr(y˜2i,P3)
Lr
Dr3 +
covb(P2,P3)
α22Lb
Dr2.
The expected profit of the feedback traders is given by:
Πf2i = E(x
f
2i(v˜ − P2)) = E(x
f
2iv˜)−E(x
f
2iP2),
with xf2i = β(P1 − P0).
The prices P1 and P0 are known before trading, the expected profit can be written as
Πf2i = β(P1 −P0)(v¯(1−α22)−α21).
First Round profit
At the first round only the rational and the overconfident agents are trading. However, they are
not informed at t = 1. As a consequence, the price at the first round P1 is known before any
trade is done.
The expected profit for the overconfident traders is given by
Πb1i = E[x
b
1i(v˜ − P1)],
33
with xb1i =
α21+α22(v¯+b)−P1
aα2
22
varb(Y¯2)
. It is straightforward to find that
Πb1i =
α21 + α22(v¯ + b)− P1
aα222varb(Y¯2)
(v¯−P1).
The expected profit for the rational traders’ profit is given by
Πr1i =
α21 + α22v¯ − P1
aα222varr(Y¯2)
(v¯−P1).
Finally, we have obtained all results about the different profits by numerical simulations.
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